



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JOURNAL

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Tuesday - 25 May 1976

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1. [REDACTED] LIAISON At the request of Diane, in the office of Representative James P. Johnson (R., Colo.), I sent her a copy of the Agency publication entitled, "Potential Implications of Trends in World Population, Food Production, and Climate."

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2. [REDACTED] BRIEFING Accompanied Ted Shackley, ADDO, and [REDACTED] to brief Chuck Snodgrass, staff of House Appropriations Committee, on DDO management systems. The briefing went well, but Snodgrass still felt he needed to see our MBO documents or receive something else to judge the effectiveness of DDO management. He put the ball back in our court to satisfy his needs, and returned to Shackley our briefing materials subject to his call.

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DD/O 76-3259

26 May 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Discussions on 25 May 1976 with  
Mr. Charles W. Snodgrass,  
Staff Member of the House  
Appropriations Committee

REFERENCE: Memorandum for Deputy Director  
for Operations from Chief, East Asia  
titled "Discussions on 3 May 1976 with  
Mr. Charles W. Snodgrass, Staff  
Member of the House Appropriations  
Committee" dated 4 May 1976

1. Background. As a followup to Mr. Shackley's 3 May 1976 briefing of Mr. Snodgrass, a Staff Member on the House Appropriations Committee, a series of meetings were held within the Agency in order to determine what categories of information which had been requested by Mr. Snodgrass as outlined in Reference, paragraph 4, would be passed to the Committee Staff. It was concluded during these discussions that the Agency should make a sincere attempt to be forthcoming in honoring as many of Mr. Snodgrass' requests as prudent judgment would permit without adversely impacting on the DCI's responsibility to protect sources and methods. A second guideline which emerged for these in-house conversations was that while we wanted to be responsive to Mr. Snodgrass' requirements, and in so doing would de facto be providing him with staff support for his inquiries into DDO manpower and budget ceilings, this would have to be accomplished without creating a situation whereby the integrity of the DDO reporting system concerning sources and methods would become distorted due to field personnel writing periodic evaluation reports, not for their organizational chain of command but for a Congressional audience. As a result

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it was agreed that Mr. Snodgrass would be given data on trend lines showing the relationship between resource allocation and program progress or lack of same for any particular fiscal year. In addition, arrangements were made to pass him written material on how bigot lists were managed. The reports evaluation system which is used in the DDO to measure the quality of the intelligence product would be described to Mr. Snodgrass in a written form, and an expanded definition of what constituted support costs in terms of the DDO's FY budget would be furnished to the Committee Staff. It was also decided to pass Mr. Snodgrass a copy of the briefing outline from which Mr. Shackley had talked when he met with Mr. Snodgrass on 3 May 1976. The Agency decided, however, that Mr. Snodgrass would not be given access to Management by Objective documents, but Mr. Shackley would orally describe the system to Mr. Snodgrass and would be prepared to answer any questions that the latter might have on how this structure was used to control DDO resources. In keeping with the spirit of these decisions the attached briefing book was prepared, after appropriate coordination within the Agency. This book subsequently served, during the 25 May discussions with Mr. Snodgrass, as the centerpiece around which additional discussions took place. A copy of this book was not left with Mr. Snodgrass, but he can call for it when he wants to refer to it in the future.

25X1A 2. Briefing. On 25 May 1976 [ ] OLC; [ ] DDO  
25X1A Plans Staff, and Mr. Shackley, ADDO, met with Mr. Snodgrass at the latter's office in the House building. The meeting which followed took place during the time frame 1100 to 1215 hours. In the course of this session Mr. Snodgrass examined in some detail all of the material which is contained in the attached briefing book. This subsequently led to a discussion of various issues which are commented on in the following paragraphs.

3. Intelligence Disseminations by the DDO. In reviewing the number of clandestine service information reports which had been disseminated by the DDO during the period FY 73 to FY 76, Mr. Snodgrass noted that the trend which was reflected by our statistics clearly showed that as of

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FY 76, CIA was less of a fire-fighting brigade than it had been in the past. Mr. Snodgrass then went on to say that it was now clear to him that CIA was producing more intelligence of a strategic nature than it had in the past. In this connection Mr. Shackley pointed out that while Mr. Snodgrass' observations were correct, it also had to be noted that this shift in emphasis was the result of a change in policy level interest in such issues as the Indochina conflict as well as a reduction of tensions in the Arab/Israeli dispute. The point was stressed that much of the Agency's collection program was driven by requirements which were levied on us by the policy makers. In short, we attempted to persuade Mr. Snodgrass that CIA was a responsive instrumentality of the United States Government which committed its manpower and fiscal resources to those intelligence issues and questions which the policy makers felt were of priority importance to them at any particular point in time.

4. Language of the Intelligence Trade as Used Within CIA. As Mr. Snodgrass acquainted himself with the material that is contained in the attached briefing book, he asked a number of questions concerning the language of the intelligence trade as it is used in CIA. A few of these examples are noted simply to underscore the point that in briefing Staff Members of Congressional committees, CIA officers must ensure that they and their audience are speaking the same language. A few of Mr. Snodgrass' questions focused on the following types of trade terms:

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b. WH. Mr. Snodgrass noted several references to the letters WH in the briefing material and asked what they meant. He was advised that these letters stood for the Western Hemisphere Division and had been used in the past in the same context as AF was used to describe the Africa Division in the DDO. The point was made, however, that the DDO had abandoned the use of the letters WH in preference to LA for Latin America as some confusion had occurred in the past as to whether WH meant Western Hemisphere or the White House. Mr. Snodgrass similingly acknowledged that his initial reaction upon seeing the letters WH was to think that this meant the White House.

c. Prestige Disseminations. The question of what constituted a prestige dissemination to selected high-level consumers was also raised by Mr. Snodgrass. In explaining this term stress was placed on the fact that a prestige dissemination might be influenced by either sources or methods sensitivity or the policy relevance of the information contained in a given report. In this context Mr. Snodgrass was briefed on how judgments were made by Division Chiefs and the office of the DDO on what items might appropriately constitute data which should be handled via the prestige dissemination channels.

5. Requirements. Mr. Snodgrass asked a number of questions about how requirements were generated within the intelligence community outside of the formal mechanism such as the key intelligence questions. This resulted in Mr. Snodgrass being briefed on the variety of interagency forums which exist for generating requirements. Additionally, Mr. Snodgrass was briefed on how the DDO reports evaluation system, in and of itself, generated requirements which were designed to close collection gaps. Mr. Snodgrass seemed to be particularly impressed with the multiple channels which were currently being used by the DDO to keep requirements current while still focusing collection resources on the broad issues that were raised by the key intelligence questions.

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6. Strategic Weapons. In reviewing a number of documents which had been sent to the DDO by customer agencies concerning the evaluation of our intelligence product, Mr. Snodgrass asked specifically for an elaboration on how DDO intelligence had been useful to policy makers concerning strategic weapons questions. In response Mr. Shackley elaborated on how DDO reporting had been the cornerstone of the American policy decision to deny certain nuclear reactors [redacted] In this context it was pointed out that DDO intelligence was used, not only as the basis for making the policy determination within the appropriate inter-agency forums that [redacted] would not be given certain nuclear reactors, but it was also the basis for making appropriate policy level demarches to the [redacted] [redacted] The point was stressed that there was a great deal of inter-departmental coordination involved in preparing these demarches in order that policy points could be made to the appropriate foreign audience without our running the risk of compromising CIA sources or methods.

7. [redacted] Mr. Snodgrass noted in the attached briefing book that DIA had done a rather extensive evaluation of the CIA-managed [redacted] for CY 74. Mr. Snodgrass indicated that he was particularly concerned with this topic and would want to return to a more detailed discussion of the [redacted] at a later date. (Comment: No specific time frame for such a discussion was set by Mr. Snodgrass. As a result once he finishes writing up his report on the House Appropriations Committee Mark-up of the FY 77 DDO budget, action should be taken at the DDO's initiative and in conjunction with OLC to determine when such a followon briefing might take place. This initiative on our part is justified, for in the [redacted] there is an important story to be told and in telling it we may get Mr. Snodgrass to appreciate more fully than he does now the key issue of manpower allocation to operational programs.)

8. Management by Objective System. Mr. Snodgrass stated that he had found the 3 and 25 May meetings to be extremely useful. In this connection he made the point that the attached briefing book was a first rate effort and represented a great deal of progress on the Agency's part

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in attempting to be both forthcoming and helpful to him and the Committee in understanding the DDO's problems. At the same time Mr. Snodgrass pointed out that while he had no quarrel with Mr. Shackley, he continued to be irritated with the totality of the Agency's attitude toward providing him with data. Mr. Snodgrass then launched into a long litany on how the Agency had not been responsive in terms of his needs as he perceived them in the time frame February to May 1976. With that as a backdrop Mr. Snodgrass then launched into his inquiry as to why the Agency was not willing to give him full access to Management by Objective documents. The dialogue which followed on this topic had a natural ebb and flow to it, but the key point that emerged from this is that Mr. Snodgrass continues to feel that unless he can see the Management by Objective documents he will not be able to have a firm understanding of DDO manpower allocation procedures. Secondly, Mr. Snodgrass claims that CIA's position that it will show Management by Objective documents to members of the Committee and not the Staff is an obstructionist tactic. His point being that the members of the Committee do not have the time to look at such documents and they thus depend on the Committee Staff for this type of substantive review. According to Mr. Snodgrass this means that if the Agency will not provide data to the Staff, it is in fact denying information to the Committee members. Attempts were made by Mr. Shackley to show how men of good will on both sides of this question could have an honest difference of opinion on the issue. In this framework Mr. Shackley reiterated the DDO position that access to Management by Objective documents by Mr. Snodgrass would impact adversely on the whole question of sources and methods as well as the integrity of the reporting system. As a followup to this position an effort was made to find out exactly what it was about the DDO manpower allocation system that Mr. Snodgrass did not understand and which he thought he might find out about from an examination of the Management by Objective documents. It was hoped that through this line of inquiry an alternate approach could be discovered which would enable us to deal with Mr. Snodgrass' problems. Our probes in this direction were unsuccessful in clarifying the issue. One can only conclude that Mr. Snodgrass is committed to finding some sort of a formula or equation which will enable him to test our manpower allocation system. We have repeatedly outlined to him the variable factors that go

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25X1A into making judgments on operational deployment of manpower such as  
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particular country, what is the operational environment in the country  
i. e., permissive or not, what are the cover possibilities, what are our  
liaison equities, and what are our needs for regional support from a  
particular country. These explanations are taken aboard by Mr. Snodgrass,  
but he is looking for something else which has less variables in it when,  
in fact, there is no magic formula for determining how one gets people to  
commit treason. This portion of the meeting ultimately ended on a friendly  
note but left unresolved the question of what was it that Mr. Snodgrass  
really wanted on the issue of manpower allocations and what could CIA tell  
him that we haven't already told him. (ACTION REQUIRED: Mr. Snodgrass  
is currently preoccupied with drafting his report on the House Appropria-  
tions Committee Mark-up of the DDO FY 77 budget. Once this task is  
completed [ ] OLC, will return to see Mr. Snodgrass and will try  
to obtain an elaboration of what specifically are the manpower issues that  
trouble Mr. Snodgrass. In this context [ ] has been asked to try to  
determine if a review, position-by-position, of two or three typical Stations  
within the DDO might give Mr. Snodgrass the insight into manpower allo-  
cations that he is currently seeking.)

9. Comment. In net assessment terms one would have to conclude  
that the 25 May meeting achieved the optimum that could be expected from  
this kind of an encounter. On the one hand the attached briefing book which  
was examined by Mr. Snodgrass was accepted by the latter as a first rate  
product. For this the A agency gets high marks. On the other hand, the  
Management by Objective system, because he can't see the documents,  
leaves Mr. Snodgrass frustrated and irritated. This evokes acrimonious  
complaints from Mr. Snodgrass with the end result being that the burden  
for seeking a solution to a problem created by Mr. Snodgrass is placed on  
the Agency. In short, we have ended up where we expected to be. Put  
another way, there appears to be no prospect for establishing the type of  
dialogue with Mr. Snodgrass which satisfies the interests of both parties.  
We are inevitably doomed to being in an adversary relationship with him,  
although it is incumbent on us to continue to minimize, to the extent that

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we can, the areas of conflict. As a result we must conclude that if the Committee makes significant cuts into FY 77 DDO manpower levels, our efforts to restore these cuts will have to be focused on the House/Senate conference. As a result action will be taken by the ADDO and [redacted] OLC, to feel the pulse of the key Staff Member on the Senate side as to where the problems may be in the FY 77 DDO budget as seen from the vantage point of the Senate.

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[redacted]  
Theodore G. Shackley [redacted]

STAT

Associate Deputy Director for Operations

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